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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHARON KAY REDDISH, 
Applicant/Appellant, 
vs. 
SENTINEL CONSUMER PRODUCTS, 
and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION 
FUND OF UTAH and SECOND INJURY 
FUND, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT WORKERS1 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
Industrial Commission 
Case No. 87000247 
Administrative Law Judge: 
Janet L. Moffitt 
Court of Appeals No. 880272-CA 
Priority No. 6 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
AND DESCRIBING NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Sections 35-1-86 and 63-46b-16, Utah Code Ann., confer 
jurisdiction of this matter on the Court of Appeals. Sharon Kay 
Reddish, an injured employee, has sought review of an Order of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah which denied her Motion for Review 
of an Administrative Law Judge's dismissal of her claim for 
additional temporary total disability compensation and affirmed 
the Administrative Law Judge's dismissal. (See the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order as Addendum 1 hereto and the 
Denial of Motion for Review as Addendum 2 hereto.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah (hereafter referred to 
as "the Fund") submits that the only issues presented for review 
are 1) whether there is a foundation in the evidence for the 
decision of the Industrial Commission of Utah (hereafter referred 
to as "the Commission") and the findings of the Administrative Law 
Judge as adopted by the Industrial Commission by its denial of the 
applicant's Motion for Review; and, 2) whether, under Utah 
workers' compensation law, the appropriate point for termination 
of temporary total disability benefits is the point at which the 
injured workers' condition has stabilized, regardless of whether 
medical treatment related to the injury continues or the worker 
has not returned to work. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The statute whose interpretation is determinative of the 
issues raised is § 35-1-65, Utah Code Ann. The statute is set 
forth verbatim in addendum 3 hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Natuyg pf the Case 
This case involves the denial of an employee's claim for 
additional temporary total disability benefits. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The proceedings began in February, 1987, when the employee 
filed an application for hearing with the Commission. The 
employee claimed compensation had not been paid for time off work; 
that her employer's workers' compensation carrier had denied 
liability for permanent partial disability; additional temporary 
total disability, medical, and permanent partial disability 
benefits. (R. 3.) The Fund responded to the application by 
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admitting the employee was injured by accident in the course of 
employment on November 4, 1986; alleging payment of $1,316.20 in 
medical benefits to the employee and payment of $534.00 temporary 
total disability benefits for the period November 4f 1986 through 
December 16, 1986; denying any additional temporary total 
disability benefits were due the employee, pending an independent 
medical evaluation of her condition; and denying any permanent 
partial disability benefits on the grounds no medical records 
indicating any permanent impairment had been submitted by the 
employee. (R. 6, 7.) 
An Administrative Law Judge heard the matter on June 3, 1987, 
and referred the employee to a medical panel for determination of 
the following: a medically demonstrable causal connection between 
the employer's problems and the industrial accident; what period 
of time the employee was temporarily, totally disabled after 
December 16, 1986; whether the employee's condition had stabilized 
so as to make a determination of permanent impairment possible; 
what percentage of permanent impairment resulted from the 
employee's industrial injury; what percentage of permanent 
impairment existed from previously existing conditions; and, what 
future medical treatment would be reasonably required in treating 
problems which resulted from the employee's industrial injury. 
(R. 0111, 0112.) The medical panel found a medically demonstrable 
causal connection between the problems of which the employee 
complained and the industrial accident, but found that the 
employee had not been temporarily or totally disabled as a result 
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of the injury after December 16, 1986, and that her condition had 
stabilized with no permanent impairment resulting from the injury 
or due to previously existing conditions. The panel also found no 
need for future medical treatment for the employee, but that all 
the treatments she received from November 4, 1986, to the date of 
its report (December 21, 1987) could reasonably be determined to 
have been required by the industrial injury. (R. 0120, 0121.) 
The Administrative Law Judge distributed the medical panel's 
report to the parties on December 28, 1987, directing them to file 
any objections to it within fifteen days from that date. (R. 
0117.) The employee filed an objection to the panel's finding 
that she was not temporarily, totally disabled after December 16, 
1986, asserting that her doctors had not released her to return to 
work since the accident and that temporary total benefits should 
be paid through December 4, 1987. (R. 0126.) The employee filed 
her objection January 13, 1988. It was received by the Commission 
January 19, 1988 (Id.), but apparently did not reach the 
Administrative Law Judge before January 21, 1988, when she drafted 
her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order in the matter. 
The Administrative Law Judge admitted the medical panel 
report into evidence and adopted its findings as her own. The 
Administrative Law Judge concluded that the employee sustained 
compensable injuries in the November 4, 1986 industrial accident 
and that she had been paid all compensation benefits to which she 
was entitled in relation to the accident, but was entitled to 
payment of all reasonable medical expenses incurred subsequent to 
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the accident. (R. 0130, 0131.) The employee filed a motion for 
review of the Administrative Law Judge's Order with the 
Commission, asking reconsideration on the basis of the objection 
she had filed to the medical panel report. (R. 0133-0135.) 
C. Disposition by the Commission 
The Commission denied the employee's motion for review, 
finding the only issue on review to be "whether the Administrative 
Law Judge correctly denied additional temporary total 
compensation." (R. 0142.) The Commission found that the medical 
panel report was correctly adopted because the employee's 
objection to it was not timely filed. The Commission also found 
no inconsistency in the Administrative Law Judge's allowance of 
medical expenses subsequent to December 16, 1986, and denial of 
temporary total compensation for any period beyond December 16, 
1986. It further found that the employee's objection to the 
medical panel report were to be rejected on the merits even if 
they had been timely filed, as medical stabilization, not release 
to return to work, marks the end of temporary total compensation. 
(R. 0142.) 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The employee, Sharon Kay Reddish, was born March 15, 1965. 
(R. 3.) On November 4, 1986, while working for Sentinel Consumer 
Products in Clearfield, Utah, she caught her foot in an opening in 
scaffolding on which she was standing, fell, but caught herself 
before she hit the ground and pulled herself back to a standing 
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position. (Id.) She continued to work for approximately thirty 
minutes, then took her lunch break. (R. 27, 29.) When she 
returned from lunchf her employer asked her if she was all right 
and she responded that her back hurt a little bit. (R. 29.) Her 
employer suggested she go home and see a doctor. (R. 29, 30.) 
Several hours later, she saw Gailen E. Lundell, D.C., a 
chiropractor. (R. 32.) Dr. Lundell found her to have low back 
pain, mid back pain, upper back pain, chest pain, severe 
headaches, and neck and arm pain. (R. 096.) He noted an expected 
date of return to work of November 10, 1986. (Id.) The employee 
continued to receive chiropractic manipulations with physiotherapy 
in the form of intersegmental traction from Dr. Lundell during 
November and December, 1986. (R. 089-0100.) The employee also 
saw Clayton R. Gabbert, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, on November 
13, 1986. Dr. Gabbert diagnosed cervical and lumbar sprain, 
prescribed flexeril, and recommended "fairly strict bed rest for 
the next four days." (R. 0102.) The employee began seeing L. 
Michael Janeway, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, on December 29, 
1986. Dr. Janeway referred her to Lili Hall, Registered Physical 
Therapist, at Rehabilitation Services Incorporated, and she saw 
Dr. Janeway and received physical therapy from Ms. Hall through 
May, 1987. (R. 039-048; R. 071-088.) Dr. Janeway's last 
notation regarding the employee indicates he felt she should be 
evaluated by a neurologist and/or psychologist. (R. 078.) 
At the request of the Fund, the employee underwent an 
independent medical examination by Edward C. Spencer, M.D., an 
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orthopedic surgeon, on April 21, 1987. (R. 066.) Dr. Spencer's 
impression of the employee's condition was that she suffered 
"postural muscular fatigue headaches." (R. 069.) He found her 
symptoms to be "multiple and mild" and related to "poor muscle 
conditioning and posture." (Id.) He found no impairment pursuant 
to the American Medical Association Guidelines for evaluating 
permanent physical impairment "because of her excellent motion and 
lack of objective injury," and no objective reason why the 
employee could not return to work. (Id.) He suggested future 
treatment of regular and vigorous exercise and aerobic 
conditioning. (Id.) In response to the Fund's specific question 
as to the date of stabilization of the employee's condition, Dr. 
Spencer stated he felt she had achieved a stable condition 
sometime within the first six weeks following her accident of 
November 4, 1986. (R. 065.) 
The employee was examined by John M. Bender, M.d., of the 
Stewart Rehabilitation Center, at the request of Dr. Janeway, on 
October 14, 1987. (R. 0122.) Dr. Bender summarized his findings 
on examination of the employee, stating, among other things, that 
she had persistent and widespread symptoms "which do not correlate 
well with her original injury;" that she "has no measurable loss 
of range of motion;" and, that her "widespread symptoms at this 
time strongly suggest a psychophysiologic disorder, though she 
still may have residual musculoskeletal symptoms from the injury 
which should not be disabling." (R. 0124, 0125.) 
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The medical pane l reviewed a l l of t h e employee 's medical 
records and phys ica l ly examined her before preparing i t s r e p o r t . 
(R. 0118-0121.) The panel summarized the review and examination 
wi th t h e s t a t e m e n t , " I t would seem to t h i s examiner t h a t Ms. 
Reddish experienced a diffuse ligamentous s t r a i n of the spine but 
n o t h i n g more s e r i o u s . " I t answered t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law 
Judge 's spec i f i c ques t ions . I t s answers, s e t for th here below the 
ques t ions , in b r acke t s , of the Administrat ive Law Judge, were as 
fol lows: 
[ I s t h e r e a med ica l ly demons t rab le c a u s a l 
connection between the problems complained of 
and the i n d u s t r i a l accident?] 
1. There i s a medically demonstrable causal 
connection between the problems complained of 
and the i n d u s t r i a l acc iden t . 
[What i s the period or per iods of time during 
which the appl icant has been temporar i ly and 
t o t a l l y d i sab led , if any, as a r e s u l t of the 
i n d u s t r i a l injury a f t e r December 16, 1986?] 
2 . The appl icant has not been temporar i ly or 
t o t a l l y d i s a b l e d a s t h e r e s u l t of t h e 
i n d u s t r i a l in jury a f t e r December 16, 1986. 
[Has t h e a p p l i c a n t ' s c o n d i t i o n s t a b i l i z e d 
s u f f i c i e n t l y so t h a t t h e p e r c e n t a g e of 
p e r m a n e n t p a r t i a l i m p a i r m e n t c a n be 
determined?] 
3 . The a p p l i c a n t ' s condi t ion i s s t a b i l i z e d 
s u f f i c i e n t l y so t h a t a permanent p a r t i a l 
impairment r a t ing can be determined. 
[What i s the percentage of permanent physical 
i m p a i r m e n t , i f a n y , r e s u l t i n g from t h e 
a p p l i c a n t ' s i n d u s t r i a l injury?] 
4 . The p e r c e n t a g e of permanent p h y s i c a l 
i mpa i rmen t r e s u l t i n g from the a p p l i c a n t ' s 
i n d u s t r i a l in jury i s 0%. 
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[What is the percentage of permanent physical 
impairment attributable to previously existing 
conditions, whether due to accidental injury, 
disease or congenital causes?] 
5. The percentage of permanent physical 
impairment attributable to previously existing 
conditions is ()%• 
[What future medical treatment, including 
surgery or medications will be reasonably 
required in treating the applicant's problems 
resulting from the industrial injury?] 
6. There is no need for future medical 
treatment, or surgery, although it is quite 
reasonable to determine that the treatments 
received to date subsequent to November 4, 
1986, were required by the work related 
accident which occurred on that date. 
(R. 0115 (questions); 0120, 0121 (answers).) 
The Fund, as the workers1 compensation carrier for Sentinel 
Consumer Products, paid the employee temporary total disability 
benefits from November 5, 1986, through December 16, 1986, prior 
to the hearing on this matter and the Administrative Law Judge's 
Order of January 21, 1988. The Fund has paid the employee's 
medical expenses for treatment related to the industrial injury of 
November 4, 1986, from that date through the date of the medical 
panel's report, December 21, 1987. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I. Point I sets forth the standard for review of 
decisions by the Industrial Commission of Utah and sets forth the 
substantial evidence on which the Commission's decision is founded 
in this case. The argument presented is that the Commission's 
decision ought to be affirmed because there is a substantial 
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foundation in the evidence supporting termination of the 
employee's temporary total disability benefits six weeks following 
her industrial injury. This was the finding of an independent, 
objective medical panel and no other evidence on the record 
refutes that finding. 
Point II. Point II sets forth the cases interpreting § 35-1-
65, Utah Code Ann., and the standard provided therein for 
terminating temporary total disability benefits at the point when 
a workers' condition stabilizes after an industrial injury. It 
also sets forth the cases which distinguish between medical 
benefits and compensation for time off work in workers' 
compensation cases. The arguments presented are that "release to 
return to work" is not the appropriate point at which temporary 
total disability benefits should cease, in this case or any other, 
but that the appropriate point is always the point of medical 
stabilization; and, that "compensation" is not, need not, and 
cannot be, tied to, correlated, or equivalent to the time during 
which medical expenses are incurred as a result of an industrial 
injury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I . THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE 
COMMISSION IN THIS CASE ARE SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD NOT, 
THEREFORE, BE DISTURBED. 
In Rushton v . Gelco E x p . , 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) , t h e Utah 
S u p r e m e C o u r t s t a t e d i t s s t a n d a r d on r e v i e w i n g C o m m i s s i o n 
d e c i s i o n s as f o l l o w s : 
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On an appeal from a decision by the 
Commission, this Court will not disturb the 
findings and orders of the Commission unless 
they are arbitrary and capricious, and they 
are arbitrary and capricious when they are 
contrary to the evidence or without basis in 
the evidence. 
732 P.2d at 111. The Rushton decision bears citing here because 
it is so similar to this case. In Rushton. the worker filed an 
application with the Commission for both temporary total and 
permanent partial disability benefits as a result of industrial 
injuries she sustained in a fall. 732 P.2d at 110. The 
Administrative Law Judge who heard the matter referred it to a 
medical panel and subsequently ordered payment of reasonable 
medical expenses related to the injury, denied the claim for 
permanent partial disability, and limited compensation for total 
temporary disability to the time between the worker's injury and 
the time the medical panel found the condition caused by the 
injury had resolved. 732 P.2d at 111, 112. On appeal, the worker 
contended, inter alia, that the evidence did not support the 
limited period of temporary total disability. Id. The Court 
responded: 
P l a i n t i f f a r g u e s , in e s s e n c e , t h a t the 
f i n d i n g s in t h i s case are a r b i t r a r y and 
c a p r i c i o u s because the admin i s t ra t ive law judge adopted the findings of the medical 
panel rather than those of . . . p l a i n t i f f ' s 
t r e a t i n g physician. According to p la in t i f f , 
the administrative law judge should have been 
required as a matter of law to give preference 
to the t reat ing physician's findings. Because 
we feel t ha t such a rule would r e s t r i c t the 
fact-f inding role of the Commission, as that 
role has been defined by s ta tu te and case law, 
we refuse to adopt i t . 
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Id . (footnotes omit ted. ) Like the p la in t i f f in Rushton, the 
employee in t h i s case argues tha t her t r e a t i n g p h y s i c i a n ' s 
reluctance to release her to return to work should take precedence 
over the medical panel 's opinion in determining the l imit of her 
temporary to ta l d i sab i l i ty benefi ts . As the Rushton Court noted, 
U.C.A., 1953f § 35-1-88 permits the Commission 
t o r e c e i v e a l l " r e l e v a n t and m a t e r i a l 
ev idence , " inc lud ing Commission-appointed 
i n v e s t i g a t o r s ' r e p o r t s and a t t e n d i n g or 
examining physicians' reports . U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-85 requi res the Commission to make 
f i n d i n g s of f a c t and provides t ha t those 
findings are conclusive. Moreover, decisions 
from th is Court have repeatedly reaffirmed the 
fact-f inding role of the Commission and have 
s t a t ed tha t the Commission must look at a l l 
re levant evidence in reaching i t s findings 
without being r e s t r i c t e d to giving evidence 
from specific witnesses more weight than that 
from o t h e r w i t n e s s e s . . . . [T]he 
Commission is the principal fact finder and, 
as s u c h , may review a l l r e l e v a n t 
e v i d e n c e . . . Adopt ing the p o s i t i o n 
advocated by p l a i n t i f f would neces sa r i l y 
narrow the evidence the Commission could rely 
upon • 
732 P.2d at 111, 112. The Rushton Court then decided that "the 
administrative law judge was not required as a matter of law to 
accept the findings of p l a i n t i f f ' s t reat ing physician and reject 
those of the medical panel" and proceeded to a review of the 
ev idence to de te rmine i f t he Commission's f i nd ings had a 
reasonab le bas is in the evidence. 732 P.2d at 112. After 
reviewing the evidence of the t r e a t i n g phys ic ian , and other 
physicians the p la in t i f f had seen, the Court s ta ted: 
The admin i s t ra t ive law judge a lso had the 
report of the medical panel on which to re ly . 
The panel based i t s report not only on i t s 
examination of and interview with p la in t i f f , 
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but also on the reports , t e s t r e su l t s , and x-
r a y s from the p rev ious examina t ions of 
p l a i n t i f f ' s t reat ing physicians. . . Thus, 
the record c o n t a i n s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence 
suppor t i ng the admin is t ra t ive law judge 's 
decision. 
Id. 
In Rekward v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 755 P.2d 166 (Utah 
App. 1988) , Rekward challenged a Commission decision adopting a 
medical panel's impairment rating which differed from that of his 
treating physician. This Court stated: 
[S]imply because the Commission adopted the 
findings of the panel rather then those of the 
independent physicians does not render the 
Commission's finding arbi t rary and capricious. 
Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 
1986). The record is clear that the medical 
p a n e l c o n s i d e r e d a l l t h e e v i d e n c e in 
determining i t s r a t i n g . Rekward f a i l s to 
convince t h i s Court the medical p a n e l ' s 
pe rmanen t p a r t i a l impairment r a t i n g i s 
arbi t rary and capricious. 
755 P.2d at 168 
As in Rushton, supra, and Rekward, supra, the medical panel 
in this case based its report not only on examination of and 
interview with the employee, but on all of the reports, test 
results/ and x-rays from the employee's treating physicians, as 
well as the reports and test results of two independent medical 
examiners, Dr. Spencer, who examined the employee for the Fund* 
and Dr. Bender, who examined the employee on Dr. Janeway's 
referral. Dr. Lundell, the first health care provider the 
employee saw after her industrial injury, stated in his first 
medical report on the employee's condition that he expected she 
would be able to return to work six days after the date of the 
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injury. (R. 096; supra, p. 6.) Dr. Gabbert, who the employee 
saw nine days after her industrial injury, recommended "fairly 
strict bed rest for the next four days." (R. 0102; supra. p. 6.) 
The Fund's independent medical examiner, Dr. Spencer, found the 
employee's conditioned stabilized as of "sometime within the 
first six weeks following" her industrial injury. (R. 065; supra* 
p. 6.) Dr. Janeway, the employee's primary treating physician, 
found no objective basis for temporary total disability, 
suggesting, rather, that she needed "evaluation by neurologist 
and/or psychologist" (R. 078; supra* p. 6) and referring her to 
Dr. Bender. (R. 0122.) Dr. Bender found the employee's symptoms 
did not correlate well with her original injury and that they 
suggested a psychophysiologic disorder. (R. 0125; supra* p. 7.) 
The record in this case contains substantial evidence in 
support of the medical panel's findings, the Administrative Law 
Judge's decision, and the Commission's decision. Given the 
dictates of § 35-1-88 and § 35-1-85, Utah Code Ann., supra, p. 
12, and the interpretations of those dictates set forth by the 
appellate courts of this state, the decision of the Commission 
should be affirmed in this case. 
POINT II. UNDER UTAH WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
LAW, THE APPROPRIATE TIME AT WHICH TEMPORARY 
TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS SHOULD TERMINATE IS 
THE POINT AT WHICH THE INJURED WORKERS' 
CONDITION HAS STABILIZED AND THERE IS NO 
INCONSISTENCY OR UNFAIRNESS IN TERMINATING 
BENEFITS AT THAT POINT ALTHOUGH FURTHER 
MEDICAL TREATMENT MAY BE NECESSARY AND PAYMENT 
FOR THE EXPENSES THEREOF CONTINUES. 
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In Booms v, Rapp Const, Co,, 720 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1986), Mr. 
Booms made the same argument the employee makes in this case. 
According to the Court, 
The first issue raised on appeal is whether 
the Industrial Commission can terminate 
temporary total disability benefits after a 
finding of medical stabilization without 
making a finding that the worker is able to 
return to work. An award of temporary total 
disability benefits is governed by U.C.A., 
1953, § 35-1-65 (Supp. 1985), which provides: 
"In case of temporary disability, the employer 
shall receive 66 2/3% of that employee's 
average weekly wages at the time of injury so 
long as the disability is total . . ." 
(Emphasis added.) The claimant argues that 
the underscored language requires that the 
disabled employee receive weekly benefits 
until a specific factual finding of ability to 
work is made . 
720 P.2d at 1366 (emphasis added.) The Court's response to Mr. 
Booms' argument is applicable to the argument the employee makes 
here: 
Temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s a r e 
t y p i c a l l y awarded a f t e r a worker su f fe r s a 
j o b - r e l a t e d d i s a b i l i t y t ha t prevents him or 
her from r e t u r n i n g to work. The purpose of 
t hose b e n e f i t s i s to "provide income for an 
employee during the time of recuperat ion from 
h i s i n j u r y and u n t i l h i s c o n d i t i o n has 
s t a b i l i z e d . " . . . S t a b i l i z a t i o n means tha t 
the peripd of heeling has ended and the 
condit ion of the claimant wi l l not mate r ia l ly 
improve* • • . identifying when the 
h e a l i n g p e r i o d has ended does not require a 
fjndjng Q£ ability t<? w<?rk; stabilization is 
s t r i c t l y a m e d i c a l q u e s t i o n t h a t i s 
appropriately decided <?n the basis of medical 
evidence. 
720 P,2d at 1366, 1367 (emphasis added.) In Rekward v. I ndus t r i a l 
Com'n of Utah, supra f t h i s Court said of Booms: 
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In Booms . . . the Utah Supreme Court 
c l a r i f i e d i t s t reatment of temporary t o t a l 
b e n e f i t s . . . [T]he Court he ld , "The 
determinat ion of the temporary or permanent 
charac ter of a d i s a b i l i t y is typical ly made 
when a c l a i m a n t r e a c h e s m e d i c a l 
s t ab i l i za t ion . " 
755 P.2d at 168 
The employee in this case argues that the rationale and 
holding of Booms should not apply to her because she, unlike Mr. 
Booms, has no permanent physical impairment and therefore receives 
no permanent partial or permanent total benefits for the period of 
time after her condition stabilized in which she was not released 
to return to work. (Amended Brief of Appellant, p. 8.) However, 
the application of Booms to this case is essential for precisely 
the reasons the employee sets forth opposing its application. 
Nowhere is the need for an objective medical finding of 
stabilization clearer than in a case in which an employee who 
suffers no physical impairment does not return to work after an 
industrial injury* Temporary total benefits are, as their name 
implies, meant to compensate the worker for the time during which 
he is temporarily and totally disabled. That is, § 35-1-65 
provides a two pronged test. One prong is that the work related 
injury renders the employee totally unable to perform meaningful 
employment. The second is that it be a temporary condition. If 
either prong ceases to exist, temporary total compensation ceases. 
When the worker's condition stabilizes, his condition is no longer 
temporary. At that point, his condition becomes permanent. If 
he is impaired, permanent partial or permanent total disability 
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categorization may be appropriate if the evidence supports either 
category. But if, as here, the condition stabilizes, the worker 
has no impairment, and there appears to be no objective injury-
related reason why she cannot return to work, benefits cease. If 
the termination point for temporary total benefits were not the 
date of stabilization, any worker injured in the course of 
employment who was subsequently unable to return to work, for 
whatever reason, would receive temporary total benefits for the 
entire statutory period specified in § 35-1-65, simply on the 
basis of her own determination of whether she wanted to return to 
work or not. Such a result is inconsistent with the statutory 
scheme and intent of the workers1 compensation laws. The intended 
purpose of workers1 compensation laws is not to make the employer 
the general insurer of the State's employees. The beneficent 
purpose of the laws would be skewed beyond benefit to worker and 
employer alike if the employee's argument were accepted. 
In Rekward. supra, Rekward sought temporary total benefits 
after his condition had stabilized and while he was in the process 
of rehabilitation because of permanent impairment. This Court 
explained: 
Rekward does not dispute he has reached 
medical stabilization, nor that he is 
permanently and partially disabled. Clearly, 
under Booms. the Commission acted properly in 
terminating Rekward's temporary total 
disability benefits as of the undisputed date 
of medical stabilization. To award temporary 
benefits after a permanent status has been 
determined would be inconsistent with Utah's 
workers' compensation statutes. Johnson. 737 
P.2d at 988. These statutes provide for only 
four categories of disability benefits. 
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Rekward would have t h i s Court c rea te a f i f t h 
" r e h a b i l i t a t i v e d i s a b i l i t y benef i t " to cover 
t h e u n c o m p e n s a t e d " g a p " b e t w e e n h i s 
commencement of r e h a b i l i t a t i o n and e i t h e r 
reemployment or a finding of permanent t o t a l 
d i s a b i l i t y . A l t h o u g h we sympathize with 
Rekward's unfor tunate s i t u a t i o n , the problem 
must be solved by the l e g i s l a t u r e and not t h i s 
Court . Booms, 720 P.2d a t 1367. 
755 P.2d a t 169 (emphasis added.) The Cour t ' s reasoning reveals 
tha t the employee's argument here t ha t her s i t u a t i o n d i f f e r s from 
Booms' b e c a u s e she i s no t p e r m a n e n t l y impaired i s f l awed. 
A l t h o u g h she i s no t impai r e d . her c o n d i t i o n , s i n c e i t has 
s t a b i l i z e d , i s permanent. As in Rekward# to award the employee 
b e n e f i t s would be incons i s t en t with Utah's workers ' compensation 
s t a t u t e s . The s t a t u t e s simply do not provide benef i t s for workers 
whose c o n d i t i o n s a r e s t a b l e and unimpaired dur ing p e r i o d s in 
which, for whatever reasons , the workers r e f ra in from working. 
In Rushton v . Gelco Exp,, sil£lA/ J u s t i c e Durham commented on 
the reasons the workers ' compensation laws permit the Commission 
to receive a l l re levant and mater ia l evidence and to make u l t imate 
f i n d i n g s of fact without being r e s t r i c t e d to giving any c e r t a i n 
evidence more weight than any o the r . Her comments are pe r t i nen t 
to the argument asser ted in t h i s point as well as Point I above. 
Adopting the pos i t ion advocated by p l a i n t i f f 
would n e c e s s a r i l y narrow t h e ev idence t he 
Commission could re ly upon and could r e s u l t in 
i n c r e a s i n g t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r b i a s i n 
proceedings before the Commission. A claimant 
could h i r e a p h y s i c i a n to t e s t i f y favorably 
even though other evidence did not support the 
p h y s i c i a n ' s t e s t i m o n y . I f we a d o p t e d 
p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n , the admin i s t ra t ive law j u d g e c o u l d n o t c o n s i d e r e v i d e n c e 
c o n t r a d i c t i n g tha t of a p r iva t e physician no 
matter how convincing tha t evidence might be . 
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Of course^ use of a medical panel does not 
eliminate all potential for bias. The 
administrative law judge appoints the members 
of medical panels, and they may subconsciously 
consider this in making findings. The 
claimant may, however, present other evidence. 
The source of medical opinion, and any 
potential for bias inherent in the source, 
should of course be a factor in the process of 
weighing the evidence, but we see no reason 
for creating a presumption in favor of 
particular evidence. 
732 P.2d at 112. The decision to terminate or continue temporary 
total benefits must be based on a finding which can be supported 
by objective medical evidence rather than on a finding subject to 
bias or a subjective determination by the applicant that she 
personally feels capable of returning to work. That is the reason 
"identifying when the healing period has ended," or stabilization, 
rather than "a finding of ability to work" after stabilization 
determines termination of temporary total benefits. Booms v. Rapp 
Const. Co., supra, at 1367. 
There is no inconsistency in the Commission's finding that 
the employee is not entitled to compensation for time off work 
after December 16, 1986, but is. entitled to medical expenses 
incurred thereafter. Professor Arthur Larson, in his treatise The 
Law of Workmen's Compensation, states: 
As a matter of common sense, it seems clear 
that liability for medical benefits should not 
be diminished by the fact that, for some 
reason, income benefits are not payable. 
2 Larson 61.11(b), p. 10-773. By far, the greatest number of 
cases involving workers1 compensation insurance are those in which 
a worker is injured on the job and needs medical attention but 
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does not need time off work. A work-related injury may require 
follow-up carer therapyf medications, etc./ while the worker 
continues in employment. Weekly compensation for time off work 
and medical expenses are different kinds of benefits and are not 
necessarily linked. One can receive one without the other. 
Kennecott Copper Corporation v. Anderson. 514 P.2d 217 (Utah 
1973); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Indus. Com'n. 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 
1979) . Compensation cannot be tied to the payment of necessary 
medical expenses. The idea set forth by the employee that weekly 
compensation ought to be paid as long as medical treatment is 
necessary is in direct contradiction of the statutes prescribing 
amounts and duration of compensation. Section 35-1-65f providing 
for benefits for temporary disability, does not mention medical 
expenses. Medical expenses are separately addressed and provided 
for in § 35-1-45. The employee's idea is also an unreasonable and 
unworkable idea, for medical expenses incurred as a result of an 
industrial injury may accrue indefinitely. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings and orders of the Commission are to be sustained 
unless they are arbitrary and capricious, which they are only if 
they are contrary to the evidence and without any reasonable basis 
in the evidence. The findings and decision of the Commission in 
this case are supported by, and reasonably based in, the evidence 
on the record. 
The Commission's interpretation of § 35-1-65 and its 
application of the holding in Booms v. Rapp Const. Co., supra, in 
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this case are not only well within the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality/ but mandated by the spirit and the letter of 
Utah's workers' compensation laws. The employee's arguments that 
"return to work" should be the standard by which termination of 
temporary total benefits is determined and that compensation for 
time off work must correlate with the duration of medical 
treatment necessitated by an industrial injury are unreasonable, 
unworkable^ and in contravention of the purposes and dictates of 
Utah's workers' compensation laws* These arguments are also ones 
previously raised and resolved in opposition to the employee's 
position in this casef as the authorities cited above reveal. 
The Fund respectfully requests this Court to affirm the Order 
of the Commission in this matter. 
DATED this J ) l day of September, 1988. 
James R. /B/Lack 
Wendy Moseiey 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 87000247 
SHARON KAY REDDISH, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
SENTINEL CONSUMER PRODUCTS and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH and 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on June 3, 1987, 
at 8:30 ofclock a.m. Said hearing was pursuant to 
Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law Judge. 
Applicant was present and represented by John T. 
Caine, Attorney at Law. 
Defendants were represented by Deborah Larsens 
Attorney at Law. 
Second Injury Fund was joined in this matter but was 
not represented at the proceedings. 
The issues to be addressed in this matter are as follows: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Causal relationship between the industrial accident 
and the applicant's alleged ongoing physical problems. 
f5 ™ <?* Tr? T* \ % sf;%v^ 
of December 16, 1986 . 
Permanent p a r t i a l impairment. 
Medical expenses . 
JAN 2 2 1383 
Workers Compensation Fund 
Legal Department 
Subsequent to the evidentiary hearing in this matter, the medical 
issues were submitted to a special panel appointed by the Administrative Law 
Judge. The panel report was received on December 28, 1987, and distributed to 
the parties. No objections having been received, the medical panel report is 
admitted into evidence. 
SHARON KAY REDDISH 
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FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant in this matter, Sharon Kay Reddish, is a 22-year-old 
female, who began working for the defendants in late September of 1986. At 
the time of her injury, the applicants wage was $3.35 per hour, working forty 
hours per week. She was not married, nor did she have any dependent children 
under the age of eighteen. 
The defendants were in the business of producing various hygiene 
items. Initially, the applicant began work as an operator of a cotton ball 
machine. She was then moved to a line where she bagged innersoles after 
production. On November 4, 1986, three or four weeks after she had begun 
working for the defendants, the applicant was moved to a new area by her 
immediate supervisors. The job required that she go up on a catwalk, which 
was approximately five and a half feet off the ground, to load tampons into a 
machine for other employees who were working below her. The catwalk covered a 
distance of almost of twenty feet between the two machines and was constructed 
of metal and boards. At approximately 11:30 a.m., just before the lunch hour, 
the applicant was moving across the catwalk to go to one of the machines. As 
she did so, she caught her left foot in a hole in the scaffolding and went 
over the side. She twisted to try and catch herself by grabbing the railings. 
She did not actually fall all of the way to the floor, because her fout 
remained caught in the hole. Instead, her legs were still on the scaffolding 
with head and back draped over the side. After a couple of moments, the 
applicant was able to pull herself back up onto the scaffolding. She was 
dizzy and frightened by her experience and had some pain in her back. She 
did, however, keep working until her lunch break. When she went for her 
break, she described her back as feeling as if it needed to be "popped**. The 
incident was reported to the office. At that time, the applicant indicated to 
her supervisor that her back hurt and she was directed to go home and seek 
some medical help. 
The applicant sought medical care the same day from Dr. Lundell, a 
chiropractor. She was referred to him by her sister. He took x-rays and 
instructed her to remain off her feet for several days. She returned to the 
doctor the following day to begin treatments and saw him initially for five 
days a week until the first part of December. At that time, she was reduced 
to three treatments a week. Sometime in December, the applicant was permitted 
by the defendants* insurance carrier to seek a second opinion from Dr* Clayton 
Gabbert. Dr. Gabbert prescribed some medication and indicated the applicant 
should remain off her feet. He also scheduled a return appointment for her. 
She was not able to keep this appointment, because the insurance carrier was 
unwilling to pay for it. 
Later in December, the applicant was permitted by the defendant 
insurance carrier to switch her care to Dr. Janeway, an orthopedic surgeon. 
Dr. Janeway prescribed intensive physical therapy and also prescribed some 
25 
SHARON KAY REDDISH 
ORDER 
PAGE THREE 
muscle relaxant medication. The applicant also attended physical therapy on a 
regular basis until the first portion of May. She continued to see Dr. 
Janeway on a regular basis. 
On April 13, 1987, the applicant saw Dr. Edward Spencer for an 
independent medical examination. By this time, the applicant had developed 
some numbness over her shoulders and neck, as well as problems with her legs. 
At the time of her hearing, the applicant described her symptoms as 
numbness in both of her legs and into her left arm. She indicated that she 
was having trouble gripping with her left arm. She also testified that her 
right arm had developed a twitch. She had regular swelling and irritation as 
well as stiffness in her neck and shoulders, but was no longer taking 
medications. 
Although the applicant initially testified that she had not had any 
major medical problems before, it was brought out on cross-examination, that 
in 1975, the applicant was struck in the eye and head by a rock and had 
headaches following that injury. She was treated at that time by Dr. Janeway 
and Dr. Van Hook. She has continued to have headaches off and on since that 
time. Approximately nine years ago, the applicant was also diagnosed as a 
borderline diabetic. In May of 1983, the records from St. Benedicts 
Emergency Room indicate that the applicant reported there for treatment for an 
assault and was treated for rib injuries. 
The medical panel assigned in this matter, diagnosed the applicant as 
having a diffuse ligamentous strain of the spine and that there was a 
medically demonstrable causal connection between problems complained of and 
the industrial accident. However, it was the panel's opinion that the 
applicant has not been temporarily or totally disabled as a result of the 
industrial injury after December 16, 1986, nor does the applicant have any 
permanent partial impairment due either to the accident or pre-existing 
conditions. The panel also indicated that although there is no need for 
future medical treatment or surgery, it was quite reasonable to determine that 
the treatment received November 4, 1986, was necessitated by the applicant's 
work related accident. No objections having been received, the Administrative 
Law Judge will adopt the findings of the medical panel. 
An adoption of the medical panel findings would indicate that the 
applicant is not entitled to any further compensation, but would be entitled 
to payment of her medical expenses incurred as a result of the industrial 
injury including her ongoing follow-up care with Dr. Janeway. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant in this matter, Sharon Kay Reddish, sustained injuries 
as a result of a compensable industrial accident on November 4, 1986, and has 
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been paid all compensation benefits to which she is entitled in relation to 
that accident, but is entitled to payment of all reasonable medical expenses 
incurred subsequent to the accident. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of the applicant, Sharon Kay 
Reddish, with regard to additional compensation benefits is, and the same is 
hereby, dismissed with the exception of ongoing medical care as outlined by 
the medical panel report. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal, 
7^/yU 
Janet L. Moffitt V[, 
Administrative Law Ju3^e 
Passed by the Industrial Commission v—-
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
^/^ day of January, 1988. 
ATTEST: 
/s/_Linda J. Strasburg ; 
Linda J. Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 
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ADDENDUM 2 
DENIAL OF MOTION FOR REVIEW 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No: 87000247 9(n- ^"5*7 0/ 
SHARON KAY REDDISH, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
* ORDER DENYING 
vs. * 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
SENTINEL CONSUMER PRODUCTS and/or * 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH and * 
SECOND INJURY FUND, * 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On January 21, 1988, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial 
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding the 
applicant in the above-captioned case medical expenses related to a November 
4, 1986 industrial injury. The applicant's claim for additional temporary 
total compensation and permanent partial impairment benefits was denied based 
on the findings of the medical panel. The Administrative Law Judge adopted 
the Medical Panel Report indicating in her Order that no Objections to that 
report had been filed. On review of the file, it is noted that written 
Objections were filed by counsel for the applicant on January 19, 1988. These 
Objections were approximately one week late based on the fifteen (15) days 
allowed for the filing of Objections as indicated in the cover letter mailed 
to the parties along with the Medical Panel Report. The Objections also^did 
not come to the Administrative Law Judge's attention until after issuance of 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order as the Order was being 
prepared for issuance when the Objections were received. As result, the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order indicate no Objections to the 
Medical Panel Report had been received. 
On February 1, 1988, counsel for the applicant filed a Motion for 
Review Objecting to the Administrative Law Judge's denial of additional 
temporary total compensation beyond December 16, 1986. Counsel for the 
applicant argues that it is inconsistent for the Administrative Law Judge to 
award medical expenses prescribed by the treating physician after December 16, 
1986 but not award temporary total compensation when the treating physician 
determined the applicant should not return to her former job for one year 
following the industrial injury. On February 5, 1988, counsel for the 
defendant filed a Response to the applicant's Motion for Review. Counsel for 
the defendant argues it was proper for the Administrative Law Judge to base 
her award strictly on the Medical Panel Report, without regard to the treating 
physician's recommendations, principally because no timely Objections to the 
Medical Panel Report were filed. Counsel for the defendant also argues that 
an award of temporary total compensation is dependent on* the applicant 
on 
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being medically unstable, not an inability to return to the former 
occupation. As the medical panel found the applicant was stable as of 
December 16, 1986, counsel for the defendant argues that the Administrative 
Law Judge was correct in denying temporary total compensation following that 
date. 
The Commission finds that the only issue on review is whether the 
Administrative Law Judge correctly denied additional temporary total 
compensation. With respect to the applicants argument that temporary total 
compensation should be continued after December 16, 1986 based on the 
Administrative Law Judgefs allowance of medical expenses after that date, the 
Commission finds it is not inconsistent for the Administrative Law Judge to 
disallow temporary total compensation and allow medical expenses. The Medical 
Panel Report was correctly adopted as no timely Objections to the Medical 
Panel Report were filed. The Medical Panel Report expressly states that the 
applicant was not temporarily totally disabled after December 16, 1988 but 
that medical expenses incurred after that date were related to the industrial 
injury. As the Administrative Law Judge's award is consistent with the 
Medical Panel Report, the Commission finds the Administrative Law Judge should 
be affirmed in her limited award. Furthermore, even if the applicant's 
Objections to the Medical Panel Report had been received timely, those 
Objections must be rejected on the merits. In the late-filed Objections, 
counsel for the applicant argues only that no release to return to work was 
granted until 1988. It is medical stabilization and not release to return to 
work that marks the end of temporary total compensation as indicated in the 
case Booms v Rapp Construction» 720 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1986). Therefore, for 
procedural reasons, and based on the merits, the applicant's Motion for Review 
and Objections to the Medical Panel Report must be denied and the 
Administrative Law Judge's Order affirmed,, 
i. Hadley 
\ 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
$¥«& day of March, 1988. 
^Linda J. Stra^org // 
Commission Secretary 
Lenice L. Nielsen 
Commissioner 
John Florez 
Coftimissioner 
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-65 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 75; C.L. 1917, 1943, 42-1-60; L. 1961, ch. 71, § 1; 1965, ch.. 
§ 3136; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 68, § 1; 1973, ch. 67, § 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
tion § 296. «=> 1628. 
35-1-65. Temporary disability — Amount of payments — 
State average weekly wage defined. 
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee shall receive 66 2h% of 
that employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such 
disability is total, but not more than a maximum of 100% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum 
of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent 
child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent 
children, not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of 
the injury, but not to exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of the injury per week. In no case shall such compensation benefits 
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of the injury over a period of eight years from the date of the injury. 
In the event a light duty medical release is obtained prior to the employee 
reaching a fixed state of recovery, and when no such light duty employment is 
available to the employee from the employer, temporary disability benefits 
shall continue to be paid. 
(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to in Chapters 1 and 2 of 
this title shall be determined by the commission as follows: on or before June 
1 of each year, the total wages reported on contribution reports to the depart-
ment of employment security under the commission for the preceding calen-
dar year shall be divided by the average monthly number of insured workers 
determined by dividing the total insured workers reported for the preceding 
year by twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall be divided by 
52, and the average weekly wage thus determined rounded to the nearest 
dollar. The state average weekly wage as so determined shall be used as the 
basis for computing the maximum compensation rate for injuries or disabili-
ties arising from occupational disease which occurred during the twelve-
month period commencing July 1 following the June 1 determination, and any 
death resulting therefrom. 
History: L.1917, ch. 100, § 76; C.L. 1917, ch. 57, § 1; 1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1; 
§ 3137; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; 1921, ch. 67, § 1; 1961, ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 
R.S. 1933, 42-1-61; L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 1939, 68, § 1; 1967, ch. 65, § 1; 1969, ch. 86, § 3; 
ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-61; L. 1945, ch. 65, 1971, ch. 76, § 4; 1973, ch. 67, § 2; 1975, ch. 
§ 1; 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, 101, § 4; 1977, ch. 151, § 1; 1981, ch. 287, § 1. 
199 
34 
